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PRIVATE AGRO ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT :

Green Business
Rising
Market-based environmental

initiatives may be an idea

whose time has arrived.

Senng it aside: A Virginia crop
producer wa lks along a strip of
ground taken out of co rn production
and given over to water stewardship
near the Rappahannock River.
photo counesy Clear Window

BY DAVID E. ERVIN AND FRANK CASEY

W:

lt:!n ho use hold incomes increase, lhe demand

and limitations of pri vate activ it ies merit more study, especial ly

for e nvironmclHal se rvices ("green" products and

during an administrat ion that seems to favor vo lulllary and

scrvict!s such as organic foods, environmcnrally

private industry actions. A lack of understanding of ca uses

friendly packagi ng, environmentally fr iendly producrion and

and co nse<:J uences of these private efforts wi ll hinder sou nd deci-

di srr ibu don processes) increases faster than tht:! dt:l1land for

sions abour rheir roles in solv in g co mplex environ mental

agricultural co mm odi ties. As a resul t, cnviro nm cn ta lman -

problems. and fai led private efro rts may prompt stTonger

agement plays a larger role in lhe food industry. The poliTi -

regul :Hion. Building understa nding of the differcnr types of

chese demands by st lli ng standards

private env ironm ental init iatives is a first ste p to using them

cal process respo nds

[0

buy-

ro help achieve soc iely's environmental objectives of meetin g

also respond. Co nsum ers and investors now

growing green marke l demand . and avoiding unn ecessa ry

and develo ping pub lic programs. Market parricip3IHs -

ers and se ll ers -

reward farms and ag ribus in esscs thar s upply desired envi-

cost and regulation.

rollm elHal se rvices alo ng with food and fiber. These mark et
parricipants are turn in g to "green" products and the firm s
that produce rhem.
Scholars and managers have devoted much elTon to eval·
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The Search for Private Green
Today's fa rm ers face a bewildering array of federal. statf!'.
and local environmental p rograms, as well as a market that is

uaring public environmental programs such as the Co nservation

increasingly rewarding environmenral quali ty. As the COStS of

Reserve Program (eRP). but li ttle an:l lys is has bee n directed

participa ti ng in pub li c programs grow, and as [he marker for

at private .:tgro-envirollm ental 1l1;.lnagemenr. The potential

green products expands. produ ce rs have new and in creased
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in ce nti ves ro pursue private env ironmental qual ity mana ge-

Other dai ry farm s moved

ment initiatives.

rcgularory costs

[Q

new locations CO avoid the added

Econom ic resear ch on business environ mcneal manage-

Satisfying the demands of "green" co nsumers and investors.

ment (BEM) in indus rries oU(side of agriculture has g rown

Remi l prod ucrs and invesrmenc fund s that emp hasize envi -

rapidly oflate. The li rerarure idemifies rhree rypes ofBEM: uni-

ro nmental performance are multiplying. fn vestmenrs in "sociall y

lateral inida(ives by individual firm s to comrol pollution or by

responsible" invcsrm enr funds g rew from $40 billion in 1984

industry groups ro self-regulate. bilateral or nego tiated agrce-

co $2.16 tr ill ion in 1999 (Socialln vcscm ent Forum , 1999),

melHs between the govern ment and firm s includ in g a volun-

and mainstream food retail ers are beginning

cary environmenral target and a timetable for reaching ir, and

ral " and "o rgani c" foods.

volunrary governmenr programs to

The rhird approach, vo luntary
government programs, has been the
mainstay for agriculture. However,
when incentives end, enviro nm enral effort usually wa nes. The potenrial for long-term environmental
pro tection thll s depends on co ntinuing the public fu ndin g. Toeal
expenditures on USDA voluntary

e nvironmcntal

Green Alphabet Soup:
An Acronym Guide

practice cerrai n types of envi-

ronmental prorection.

rcgulation s. The

incentive to avoid government regu-

BEM: Business Environmenta l
Management
CRP: Conservation Reserve Program
WRP: Wetland Reserve Program
EQIP: Environmenta l Qua lity Incentives
Program
WHIP:Wildlife Habitat Incentives
Program
RSA: Resource Stewardship Agreement

lation may increase as public demand
for an improved ellvironmcnc grows.
However, the cons of building coalitions among diverse farming interesrs
may restrict effective BEM initiatives
in farming.
Strategic "management" of competirors. Addin g expend itures co
imp rove env ironmcnraJ performance
may increase a firm's profits relative ro
those of irs comperirors if its actio ns

ince ntive programs for soil erosion
co mro l, improved warer qua li (y, wi ldli fe habi(;lt, and other
purposes have ranged from $3.2 billion

sroc k "natu -

Preempti ng o r m itigati ng future

enco urage individual firm s (farms)
[0

CO

to

$3.7 billion per year

in nominal tcrms since \992 (Z inn).
The level offundi.ng has declined in real term s. Congress may
bl? unabl e to appropriarc enough funds for ince nrives to sarisfy

ca use t he competitors' ex penditures to ri se eve n high e r in
matchin g the performance. Al so, early adopte rs may enjoy a
straregi c

COSt

ad vantage by forcing comperitors

[0

follow suit

or ri sk public or market penalties.
Redefinin g markers. So me firm s can redefin e their mar-

th e growth in th e public's demand for agro-environmcncal

kets to deliver more env ironment-based va lue to custom ers.

improvemcnrs. Program refo rm s (hat foster unilateral in irimives

For exampl e. so me ran chers ha ve differentiat ed th eir wool

o r negotiated agreeme nt-s may increase the effective ness of the

or beef products to show rhat they are usin g "predator fr iendl y"

remaining public fund s.

production managemc nr sys tems.

In our judgment, unilarera.l and negotiated environm enral

Early evi dence, mostly from outside agriculrure, suggests

schemes in agriculture will increase in number because of un sar-

chat rhe probability of actua ll y und ertaking BEM in creases

isfi ed public demands for environmental services, along with

with firm size and higher R&D ca pacity. Firms also have more

efforrs by fa rmets and agribusin esses to avoid more stringe nt

ince ntive to adopt BEM sc hemes if they produce final goods,

reg ulati ons. Fi ve different but related motivations for private

fa ce stron g compe tici o n, a re inn ovative in th eir producrio n

in vo lvement in [he production of environmenral se rvi ces are

practi ces, or if they are usi ng older production equipmenr and

described here.

will incur lowe r COStS aFter replacing ir.

Improving firm productivity. The creation of production

Grow in g cons um er demand s fo r green foods shou ld pe r-

and marketing systems to implement BEM ca n lead ro the dis-

suade an increasing number of agriculrural firms to practice

cove ry of COS t reductions or opportu niti es for new products.

BEM. The growth in green mutual fund s suggests investors

Firms may find COSt savings from usin g BEM information ,

also in flue nces rhe be havi o r of firms. Capital markers penal -

management sysrc ms, and production techniques. Boggess.

ize firms for higher than expected levels of toxic emi ssion and

John s, and Meline ( 1998) found productivity ga ins for some

reward them for superio r environm emal performance. Businesses

dairy farms thac adjusred

respond to such investor pressure. These pressures wiU mose likely

[Q

highe r nutrient pollution control

standards for Lake Okeechobee. The regub.tians encouraged (hese

be passed on

dajry farm ers to adopt new production technologies thar simu.1ran eo usiy redu ced water pollution and improved nct ret urn s.

rraCts to reward fanners whose producti o n systems protect rhe
envlronm enr.

to

food processing and retai l firms thar use con-
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Firms with poor environmental records are more likel y ro
undertake BEM [han firms [hat do nor face such cond irions.

Institutional Innovations

There are fewer environmentaJ regulatory penalties in agricuJrure

Improved coordi nation in rhe delivery and adm inistrative
systems of the multi-layered federal, state, and local resou rce

than ot her indust ries. However, rhe number of regularory

conservation programs decreases producers' transaction (search

programs affecting farming is growing, especially at state and
local levels and for animal agricultu re operatio ns. The trend

and negotiation) and administ rative COS ts. One possibility is

wi ll likely co nrinue. Agriculture's tradi tion of vo lu nrary gov-

private contract ing to bundle together several programs aimed
at rescoring or conserving enviro nmental amenities. A contract

ernmem program.s backed by public payments stems in part

of this type migh t be termed a Resource Stewardship Agree-

from the problems of identifying
and deali ng with diffuse and num er-

ment (RSA).

ous nonpoint sources of pollution.

RSA des ign, administration , and

Public progra ms designed ro help
spread BEM in farm ing can assist in

moni toring. Several states presently
usc staff funded by non-profit

red ucing such persistent problems.

gro ups to implement conserva tion

T he private sector can assist with

programs. In O regon, rhe O regon
Wedands Joint Venture Initiative

Giving Private Initiatives a
Public Boost

fu nds a posit ion within the State

Public desire [Q improve the en vi-

Natural Resource Co nservation Ser-

ronmenral pe rform ance of agricul-

vice to process WRP appl ications.

ture has spawned seve ral programs
at {he federal , state, and loca l lev-

Si mil arly, crop co nsuJcants co uld
represent seve ral producers inter-

els. T he la rgest is rhe eRP and irs

ested in designing agreements for

companion programs - the Buffer rnitiative, the Conservation
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP). and the We dand

an area or a watershed protection plan.
T he traditional delivery public agency roles are needed if
unilateral and bi lateral BEM iniriatives are (0 grow. Techni-

Reserve Program (WRP). The smalle r Environmental Quali,y ln cenrives Program (EQIP) and ,he Wi ldl ife Habita,

ca l advi ce and fund ing for production syste ms and monjror-

Incentives Program (WHIP) rargel specific issues. The mOli-

ing remain esse nti al, and public age ncy capacity in ed uca tion

vatio ns fo r BEM offer ins ights inco porential cha nges in the

and training should extend to integrated production - environmental systems that reduce waste and afford green marketing

programs to bu ild more private environmental management.

opportuni t ies. Reducing producer uncenainty co nce rnin g

Farming for Flexibility

potential regularory penalties in the ea rl y stages of BEM will

G iving producers flexibil iry allows them

to

captu re the

for managing enviro nmental goa.ls and implementi ng envi-

reimb urse ment (green payme nts), COSt sharing, tax allowances,
deposit/refund schemes, conserva tion case ments, and trad -

ronmental quality standards.
Ahernative market institutions [hat help producers cap-

able development or pollming ri ghts offers such fl exi bili ty.
Ifflcxible mea ns are available, producers arc free to choose the

ture the full socia.l benefirs of thei.r environmen tal management

mi x of incentives that maximizes their net benefits while also

cru.cial attributes of institution buil d in g is providing producers and consumers with ti mely and credib le information
about opport unities to sell enviro nm ental services suc h as

co nrributin g to publ ic environmental objectives.
Programs that all ow last minute adjustments because of
limited knowledge of th e future effects of prese nt eco nomi c
and environmental decisions and actio ns will improve overall cos t-effectiveness. Producers will also benefit from the fl exib ili ty to design, test, and implement - with possible assistan ce from pu blic agen cies, third-party non-profit groups, or
certifi ed private co nsultants - new green techno logies and
marketing strategies appropriate
nomic conditions.
36

foster cost-effective private investments. Public agencies ca.n
use various options for providing regu la tory cer rain ry in rerurn

prod uctivi ty and marketing benefits that ste m from BEM. A
menu of ince ntives incl uding, bur nOt limited to, fu ll COSt

CHOICES
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local physical and eco-

invest ments require investigation as wel l. One of the most

wildlife hunring and viewi ng. Government agencies can assist
in the development of sucb ma.rket institutions.

Technology Research and Development
Agro-e nvironmental services often suffe r mi ssing marker
incentives for twO differenr reasons. Some bene.fits ex rend geographically beyond the farm boundary, as with reductions in
sediment and nutrients. O ther benefits, such as the prese rva-

rion of biodiversiry, fa ll mosdy

[0

furure generatio ns. Public

Boggess, W., G. Johns, and C. Meline. "Economic Impacrs of

inves tm em in developing production syste ms that reduce envi-

Water Quality Programs in the Lake Okeechobee Watershed of

ronmenral wastes and public ri sk is essential to ca pture long

Florida." Batie,S, D. Ervin, and M. Schulz, Eds. Business-Id

term social benefirs. The new R&D orientatio n req uires increased
public funding and an ongoing effo rt co enh ance adoption of

Initiatives in EnvironmentaL Management: The Next Gen~rtltion
oJPolicy? Department of Agricultural Economics Special

BEM in agricul ru re, and to respo nd to demands for agro-envi -

Repo rt 92, Mich igan State Univers ity, 1998, pp. 165-86.

ronm emal services.
Casey, E. A. Schmitz, S. Swi nton, and D. Zilberman, eds.

An Organization's Got to Know Its Limitations
Public program s will continue to play important env iron mental managemenr roles, but one can make (h e case rhat the

Flexible incentives for tbe Adoption ofEnvironmental
Technologies in Agriculture. Norwell: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1999.

leading edge of agro-enviro nm entai managemenc is shifting ro [he privare secror.

A shift toward

Reinhardt. F. Down to Earth: Applying

Bot h private for-profit and non-profic

business

Business Principles £0 Enviromnemal
Management. Boston: Harvard Business

organizations are currently engaged in these
activities. However, assuming thar privarc

environmental

acrio n will mitigate all ag ro-environmen-

management means

ral problems is ask ing roo much . Torally

School Press, 2000.
Segerson, K. and N. Li. "Voluntary

privare srrategi es and ve ntures will likely

that farmers and

approaches ro enviro nmenral proreccion."

encou nter fai lure , frusrrate public envi-

agribusinesses will

The international Yearbook of
Environmental and &souru Economics.
J999/2000. H . Folder and T. Teitenberg,

ronmenral demands , and jeopard ize rhe
full porcnrial of BEM until resea rchers can
better determ ine:

have greater access
to rewards for

Eds. C hel ten ham: Edward Elgar, [999

pay for environmental arrrib tl(es associ-

producing

Social In vestment Po rum . 1999 Trends

:ued wirh food and fiber products and their

environmental

Co nsumer demand and willing ness co

production processes;
In vestment costs and lo ng- ru n returns

goods.

to incegrared production syste ms rhar
reduce waStes and conse rve environmcncai se rvices;

R~port.

(\\NI\\I. sociaJin ves r.org).

Z inn, J. Conservation Spending in Agriculture: Trends and Implications. CRS

Repon fo r Co ngress. Co ngress ional Research Service. The

BEM tran saction and administrative cos ts for ad dressing

Lib rary of Co ngress, Octobe r 6, 1999.

compl ex problems, slich as the prmccrion ofbiodiversiry on publi c and privare lands; and
Potential rol es of NGOs, fo r eco- Iabeling, ce rtifi ca tion,
monitoring, and other services.
A shift toward BEM means that farmers and agribusinesses
wi ll have grearer access

(Q

reward s fo r producing envi ro nmental

goods. Private incentives can develop and spread

David £. Ervin is Research Professor in th~ Environmental
Sciences and R~sotlrces Program at Portland State University fwd
Senior Policy Analyst, Wallace Center for Agricultural and
Environmental Policy. Winrock international. Frank Casry is
Natttrtll Resources Economist for Defmders of Wildlift:·

c n viro n ~

mentally and economicaJly susrainable production and marketing

Note: T his article is adapted from a keynote

sys tem innovations. Howeve r, public ro les remai n esse nti al,

address prepared fo r Challenging the

especially in setring clear performance targers, reducing regu-

Agl'icuitltral Ecollomics Paradigm, a

latOry risks during trans ition, delivering management ed uca-

symposium ho no ring Luth er G. Tweeten,

rion , and developing

scien ce~based

in nova ti ons for [he next

generation of food and fiber syste ms.

Ande rso n Professor of Agr:icul rural
Marketing, Trade and Policy, September lOIl , 2000, The O hio State Universiry,
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